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On John Ashbery’s Poetry 
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Author Stephen Koch has famously characterised John Ashbery’s poetic voice as ‘a hushed, 
simultaneously incomprehensible and intelligent whisper with a weird pulsating rhythm that 
fluctuates like a wave between peaks of sharp clarity and watery droughts of obscurity and 
languor’.1 One may easily speculate why such a characterisation came to be well-known. In 
claiming that it is Ashbery who borders on the unintelligible, the formula makes a 
simultaneously independent claim as to its own weird concoction of unintelligibility. It is 
difficult to comprehend, for instance, intelligence and incomprehensibility as emanating at the 
same time, just as it is difficult to maintain the notion of simultaneity that relies on a kind of 
‘pulsating rhythm’ with bipolar peaks. If a reviewer must depend on such ‘watery droughts of 
obscurity and languor’ to speak of the object he reviews, the effect is that of the review’s 
undeniable reliance. Not “I’m not sure he knows what he is talking about”, but “I’m not sure 
what he is talking about”. 
The sense of this evolves unforgivingly should one look through a register of more such 
prominent reviews. In the Georgia Review, for instance, Peter Stitt maintains that ‘Ashbery has 
come to write, in the poet's most implicitly ironic gesture, almost exclusively about his own 
poems, the ones he is writing as he writes about them’,2 and Roger Shattuck makes a similar 
observation: ‘Nearly every poem in Houseboat Days shows that Ashbery's phenomenological 
eye fixes itself not so much on ordinary living and doing as on the specific act of composing a 
poem’, and ‘[t]hus every poem becomes an ars poetica of its own condition’.3 Writing for the 
New York Times, Langdon Hammer suggests that ‘Ashbery’s writing, whatever else it is about, 
is usually about other writing which it alludes to, borrows from or comments on’.4  
What these observations have cemented is the idea that Ashbery’s is not a simple self-
referential relation. In the manner that his poetry does fall back upon itself, it refers to things 
other than its own self—‘his own poems’, ‘other writing’, or how it has itself come to be. At 
the same time, these other things that his poems may direct us to have scant existence 
independent of this referee. Surely he sets up what he writes about. But oddly, he seems to give 
this bit of tact away. The poet shares with us not only his setting, but the act and fact of setting 
it up. What often does not fail to strike us is the sense that we, even his audience, may be part 
 
1 Stephen Koch, ‘The New York School of Poets: The Serious at Play’, The New York Times (11th 
February 1968), para. 4. <https://movies2.nytimes.com/books/00/06/04/specials/koch-ny.html> 
[accessed 1 December 2020]. 
2 Peter Stitt, as quoted in ‘John Ashbery’, Poetry Foundation, para. 2. 
 <https://www.poetryfoundation.org/poets/john-ashbery> [accessed 1 December 2020]. 
3 Roger Shattuck, ‘Poet in the Wings’, The New York Review, (23rd March 1978), para. 11. 
<https://www.nybooks.com/articles/1978/03/23/poet-in-the-wings/> [accessed 1 December 2020]. 
4 Langdon Hammer, ‘But I Digress’, New York Times, (20th April 2008), para. 5. 
<https://www.nytimes.com/2008/04/20/books/review/Hammer-t.html> [accessed 1 December 2020]. 
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of that setup. So that now, if we ask what his poems are about, we do not inquire from the 
outside, but from the innermost fold: what are we about? 
This article attempts a critical examination of the limits of a staged conversation between 
Heidegger’s Being (of poetry) and Ashbery’s poetry (of Being). In a shared phenomenological 
approach, the philosopher and the poet have either asked or answered the question about Being. 
While Ashbery’s answer is entirely foreshadowed by what Heidegger asks, the response is also 
one that the very asking of the question (by virtue of itself) refuses. It thereby eludes 
Heidegger’s grasp, perhaps forever. In contrast, Ashbery never asks, and indeed his poetry may 
be read as the possibility of a relief from (rather than a response to) the agony of questioning.  
The shortest address to the question of Being is contained in the notion of “contingency”, which 
is drawn out under different guises from several of Ashbery’s poems. But, as such, there is no 
pretense to explaining Ashbery. This discussion of his work instead hinges upon the discussion 
of a number of thinkers in general, and Heidegger in particular. In the formation proposed here, 
it is impossible to discuss Ashbery on his own terms, and not merely because these terms are 
not his. It is because, in and through his poetry, he actively renounces any claim to the terms 
at his disposal (thereby rendering them wholly disposable), such that even while using the terms 
himself, he refuses to put them to use. The notoriety of nonsense that his poems have given rise 
to is one such result. The objective of this exercise is to read Ashbery’s poetry in terms that 
may instead in themselves be readable. This manner of experiencing Ashbery is like rendering 
readable what in essence is unreadable—like the figure of the “subaltern” whose subalternity 
is expressed in a mode that cannot be its own. The essence of unreadability that Ashbery’s 
poetry embodies must still in itself be readable for this assumption to work. 
If, for Heidegger, a metaphysical enquiry is either a highly sophisticated or a moderately 
garbled Will-to-Power, for Ashbery it implies simultaneously a self-concealing form of poetic 
urge. Metaphysics, according to Heidegger, is an inauthentic form of poetry, poetry that sees 
itself as anti-poetry, a cache of metaphors that its authors thought of as an escape from 
metaphoricity.5 The reason why only poetry is able to successfully address the question of 
Being is because, for Heidegger’s purposes, we are nothing save the words we use. Only a 
metaphysician, a power freak, would think otherwise. They would repeatedly confuse truth 
with correctness. If, on the other hand, we were anything other than the words at our disposal, 
there would be neither a condition nor need for metaphysics. What Judith Butler has designated 
as ‘something’—in ‘something about the other can be indexed by language, but not controlled 
or possessed’—is the sense that language is entirely complicit in its own inadequacy and its 
excessiveness.6 Surely it pays the price for one with the other: language tends to be excessive 
and get ahead of itself because it fails to self-express adequately, and language lacks potency 
in its trying to overreach its mark. Relying on the failure of language, metaphysics seeks 
correctness in the denial of the truth (of failure) and art seeks truth in denial of itself; apropos 
 
5 See Martin Heidegger, Introduction to Metaphysics (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1959), pp. 
30-32. 
6 Judith Butler, Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity (New York: Routledge, 
1993), p. 126. 
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Being, it locates the ‘language of Being’ in the being of language affirming Jacques Lacan’s 
formulation: ‘The unconscious is structured like a language’.7 
According to Heidegger, it is only when we escape from the verificationist impulse to ask the 
correctness of a particular question that we are asking questions which Heidegger thinks are 
worth asking. These questions would address not the rightness of the question but rather its 
questionability. Only then are we Dasein, because only then do we have the possibility of being 
authentic Dasein, Dasein which knows itself to be “thrown”. For, at least in the West, ‘Dasein 
[…] is ontologically distinguished by the fact that, in its very Being, that Being is an issue for 
it’, as Richard Rorty quotes.8 And, he goes on: ‘only then is there a Da, a clearing, a lighting-
up’, a lifting-of-the-veil—that is, the enforced awareness that there is an open space 
surrounding present-day social practices.9 This open space is ironically what Ashbery opens 
up. What I am getting at is: with his poetics we are Dasein. 
The “available reality” that Ashbery pays no mind to, and does nothing to exemplify, would be 
Rorty’s spin on Heidegger’s world-view: “final vocabulary”.10 Only there is no finality to it. It 
fails to both define Being and address the question of Being, because a final vocabulary just 
happens to be one among many possible ones; it is utterly contingent, and entirely incidental.  
Or perhaps not. For such incidence cannot simply designate the purity of a coincidence between 
the object and its definition, subject and the predicate, motive and motion. Rather it is the 
motion that creates the motive, the definition that begets (by definition) its object, and the 
predicate that predicates the subject into being by virtue of itself. Colonising forms and 
colonised subjects are not natural collaborators. Yet the underlying contingency of the force 
and form of colonisation dictates that no one final vocabulary can set to terms contingency 
(Being) as such. Ultimately it is one which we cannot but help using, one which we always, 
already find ourselves thrown into, straddled with. We cannot undercut it, critique it, or turn it 
upside down, for it is in every sense final. And because of this overarching sense of finality 
about it, there is no way of reaching beyond it, no way of devising a metavocabulary in which 
to phrase criticisms of it. Neither can we test it for adequacy in isolation, as there is no non-
linguistic access to Being. Being is, as Rorty suggests, what final vocabularies are about. This 
conception of the “about” is as far as we get, therefore. What the final vocabulary is determines 
the indeterminate nature of what the final vocabulary is about. Contrary to the euphemism 
“what you see is what you get”, here what we (always, already) have is what we get. That 
which we are endowed with begets that which we shall be endowed with. We are caught in a 
 
7 Jacques Lacan, Écrits: A Selection (London: W. W. Norton & Company, 1997), p. 147. 
8 Martin Heidegger, Basic Writings from Being and Time (1927) to the Task of Thinking, ed. by David 
Farrell Krell (New York: Harper Collins, 2008), p. 32, as quoted in Richard Rorty, ‘Heidegger, 
Contingency and Pragmatism’, in A Companion to Heidegger, ed. by Hubert L. Dreyfus and Mark A. 
Wrathall (London: Blackwell, 2005), pp. 511-32, p. 523 
9 ibid.  
10 A final vocabulary, according to Rorty, is a sometimes-unique set of words a person depends upon. 
While the set may not be constitutive of all potential words at a person’s disposal, a final vocabulary 
may cause Angst in its user not because it is exclusive; rather, the cause of discomfort is never the 
limited range of words, but the limitedness of words (any or all) themselves. See Richard 
Rorty, Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), p. 73. 
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circular movement of sameness and repetition that always and by default leads to its own 
starting point; in Hegelese, subject is the name for this movement. In a similar trajectory, Lacan 
refound the meaning of the Freudian death drive in this manner (as the repetitive urge to go 
back to the primal state, which would be equivalent to death as death of movement, urge, drive), 
while the concept of refinding—finding the already found, a dog after its tail—is itself 
Freudian.11  
Ashbery’s long poem ‘Self-Portrait in a Convex Mirror’ is an indication: 
Francesco one day set himself 
To take his own portrait, looking at himself for that purpose 
In a convex mirror, such as is used by barbers… 
He accordingly caused a ball of wood to be made 
By a turner, and having it divided it in half and 
Brought it to the size of the mirror, he set himself 
With great art to copy all that he saw in the glass.12 
 
Admirably described by Vasari, the self-portrait of Parmigianino is a particularly touching 
creation. The painter depicts himself as if on a mirror, albeit a (fake) one. He looks at himself 
on a convex mirror, and then takes to replicate the image on a replica of the mirror: a same-
sized convex surface of wood. The effect is slightly stylised in that, while a self-portrait such 
as Rembrandt’s reminds one less of a mirror and more of a traditional portrait, Parmigianino’s 
would inverse these relations. Because a portrait is generally rectangular in shape and created 
from the reflection on a plain mirror image, our perception of the framing of a self-portrait is 
not that of its likeness with an actual mirror (of course, when we are not the painter ourselves). 
Parmigianino perhaps only after himself replicates a convex image on a convex surface. When 
we look at his painting, we are not looking at his self-portrait or even a mirror-image in an 
usual sense (that is, when we know in our heads that this is a mirror image). We are instead 
looking as if at a mirror in a much more technical sense, such that the mental assumption now 
reverses itself: we have to remind ourselves not that this is a mirror image, but that this is a 
portrait. The technique as that special form of artistic talent demonstrates that this is more 
mirror than mirror-image. And because this a mirror stylistically and not technically, it gives 
rise to the notion of that which is in the mirror more than the mirror itself. That thing that is 
capable of transforming wood into mirror, say. 
What is at stake here? Something more than the technical effect in that the painter may have 
found himself in an image not of his own. With he surface of the painting being convex like 
the mirror, it is as if he paints on the mirror the image that the mirror itself returns. In painting 
an image of his that is returned by the mirror, even his (own) image is not simply tendered his 
own, but rather of his own making. All self-portraits are an issue after their own, but 
Parmigianino’s is special in that the painter here overtakes the mediating agency of the mirror. 
 
11 Lacan’s “partial objects” is another refinding of Freud’s “partial drives”—the original designator of 
circularity and repetition. See Jacques Lacan, The Seminar, Book XI: The Four Fundamental 
Concepts of Psychoanalysis (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1998), pp. 197-198. 
12 John Ashbery, ‘Self-Portrait in a Convex Mirror’, in Self-Portrait in a Convex Mirror (New York: 
Penguin Books, 1976), p. 68. 
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As he paints, in a sense, the image on the mirror for the mirror itself, he makes possible the 
refinding of himself on the mirror. Ashbery’s obsession in the poem with Parmigianino’s 
technique (that he goes to lengths describing) is an unconcealed form of self-obsession. His 
own technique of defying, denying, and contesting the many manners of designating essence 
only takes us closer to his conception of essence, while his concern with aboutness cuts right 
to it. Every possible final vocabulary, by virtue of their finality, exhausts and circumscribes the 
question of Being. And in so far as Being is inexhaustible, these vocabularies are automatically 
excluded from asking after Being while at the same time reifying the impossibility of 
contemplating Being. Ashbery’s contribution is in making his audience aware of this. He is, in 
the words he uses and the ways he uses them, in the habit of tempting and taunting the 
vicissitude of Being—the only way of begetting which is. The mirror image that the painter 
reproduces is not only of but also as a mirror image. There is no vanity of das Ding here. No 
pretence of the self behind the self-portrait. The proclamation is, the self is the self-portrait. 
Ashbery’s poem, like its subject of the self-portrait, reveals the contingency at the heart of 
Being, or that Being ultimately is. Like Parmigianino who paints not a reflection on a mirror 
but in a sense the mirror itself, Ashbery uncovers not the nature of Being but Being itself. Both 
artists must make compromises, however. Parmigianino turns with his brush wood into mirror, 
Ashbery must on his part do with the words he finds himself thrown into. In this, and only in 
this necessarily compromised state, is Being unveiled to be. Here, the Heideggerian assertion 
is upheld one more time: there can be no “one” better understanding of Being than any other, 
for every such means of understanding operates on a particular and contingent final vocabulary.  
To seek a better understanding is therefore to engage in power relations that operate on self-
deception. Being is not the one that masters, or one that can be mastered, and even if there is 
no more to Being’s poem than Dasein , no being can be related to Being for the simple reason 
that every being is merely about the aboutness of Being. This aboutness of Being is another 
name for the inevitability of compromise that both Ashbery and Parmigianino must (sur)render 
(to). For Being is but this aboutness of Being. The conceptual leap of faith from writing about 
Being to writing Being itself in in full recognition of Being’s metonymic basis. In Being’s own 
relation to itself there is situated the paroxysm of Being itself; that is, Being is situated 
coincidentally with its being refound. Being’s movement unto itself is the only and ultimate 
guarantee of it. 
When Ashbery discloses Being with/in an indispensable universe of words that is the making 
neither of his nor of a locatable other, he discloses a kind of nothing that would not simply go 
away. As he attempts to mean nothing at all, which he regularly does, his attempt to positively 
assert negativity is, however, not nothing. The positivity of this exercise itself lives on. Indeed, 
it must be tremendously difficult to nearly impossible to mean absolutely nothing in a truly 
meaningful way. Tied as the final vocabulary is to the finality of meaningfulness (finality that 
is meaning), Ashbery creates non-meaning out of meaning, nonsense out of words, emptiness 
out of metaphors. He courts cynicism because he is a practicing cynic. From Paradoxes and 
Oxymorons: 
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It has been played once more. I think you exist only 
To tease me into doing it, on your level, and then you aren’t there 
Or have adopted a different attitude. And the poem 
Has set me softly down beside you. The poem is you.13 
 
The poem is thus both sein and dasein. It is the route that takes to Being as well as Being itself, 
while the irreducible gap between Being and its disclosure all but coincides with Being’s self-
identity. Being is that which is at a distance from itself. Or, to go further, Being is the distance 
of itself from itself. It is exemplary how Ashbery here both invokes the sameness of Being unto 
itself, and the possibility of an irreconcilable difference. The abstract notion of poetics that 
engenders every poetic arc also endangers it into being greatly deficient.  
But why must the self be contained in an image of itself? Why is it that the self is but a replica? 
It is so because the very conception of Being is a revelation of it. In writing Being, Ashbery 
does not procreate Being, but he does produce the image of Being to/for itself. Being is 
mediated in a self-image because it is in its nature to reveal itself to itself. Da and sein are 
composite primordially. In which case, why insist, however, that Ashbery does not write Being 
into being? He himself answers. It is because Being (already, always) is, that he writes at all. 
While he may write Being, Being must there already be. That is, Being is primordially. 
This super-immanence of Being, as also Heidegger’s conception of it, is opposed to the 
traditional ontotheological enterprise. Being is not immanent in the writing of it, as Baruch 
Spinoza contended God is in his creations.14 If Being is that which is written and the writing 
of it, the revelation of Being constantly takes place in the manner of that which is (lacking a 
predicate). Being reveals itself to be but (not)itself. If Being must only appear, its appearance 
is proof of its existence, yes, but not its existence per se. Appearance being the form of Being 
and not simply its container, Being is programmed to forever redirect to itself. Essence is 
appearance qua appearance, as Hegel argued. 
The nature of Being in appearance is not, “this is ‘it’”. But, “‘it’ is”. When Ashbery writes that 
the inspiration is lacking once it is realised, as if it always already were lacking in itself, he 
seems to suggest that at the moment he writes Being, Being precisely ceases to be. As if it never 
were to begin with. The subversive negativity of Ashbery’s potential is contained also in not 
writing Being, and thus (not) letting it be. If the gap between Being and its image is 
indeterminable and irreducible, it becomes an impossible proposition. For the irreducibility of 
the gap would amount to its determination, while the indeterminacy of the gap would imply 
not only that Being and its image are situated in perfect coincidence, but that they are one and 
the same. Being is only its own image. As a self-image, or as self re-doubled, Being both is 
and is not, like Parmigianino’s peculiar self-portrait that is both a mirror (stylistically) and not 
one (technically). The reason Being must only ever make an appearance, must only be an 
image of itself, is because every final vocabulary is an enclosure or negation of what every 
 
13 John Ashbery, ‘Paradoxes and Oxymorons’, in Shadow Train (New York: Penguin Books, 1981),  
p. 3. 
14 See Catherine Malabou, ‘Before and Above: Spinoza and Symbolic Necessity’, Critical Inquiry, 
43(1) (2016), 84-109. 
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final vocabulary is about: Being. Ontologisation of Being, its dislodging, is simultaneously its 
only ontic measure. That which sets Being up must necessarily not let Being be, as with Hegel’s 
definition of the subject as that which contains within itself its own contradiction.15 
Thus, the lack of a predicate to Being in this renewal warrants qualification. It is not enough to 
say only that Being is. One must add with it a negative assertion. Being is (not). Being is that 
which (it) is not. The positive condition of Being is in its nothingness. In order for this 
nothingness to be however, Being has to precede it. Being must be in order not to be. This is 
why Being cannot be discounted. It is not simply nothing. To be or not to be is a settled 
question. To be (something) is to not be (something else). As Rorty suggests:  
To be primordial is thus to have the ability to know that when you seize upon an 
understanding of Being, when you build a house for Being by speaking a language, you 
are automatically giving up a lot of other possible understandings of Being, and leaving 
a lot of differently designed houses unbuilt.16 
When Ashbery mentions Being’s not-there or a possible change in Being’s attitude (to non-
Being), he is being primordial. He subjects Being itself to primordiality; in a Heideggerian 
sense, to Being before the advent of Time, or before Time as eternity began.  For instance, in 
the middle of Being and Time, Heidegger writes: 
In the end the business of philosophy is to preserve the force of the most elementary 
words, in which Dasein expresses itself, and to keep the common understanding from 
levelling them off to that unintelligibility which functions as a source of pseudo-
problems.17 
The problem here is both Rorty and Heidegger are caught up in concepts such as ‘differently 
designed houses’ or ‘the most elementary words’, as if these do not also form part of a certain 
final vocabulary. Even the most elementary words are words made possible by the vocabulary 
that a language presents, and differently designed houses implies that they are built already. 
Rorty is right, however, in that Heidegger never tells us how we may anticipate or begin to 
contemplate something truly ontological—that which takes the finality away from a final 
vocabulary. He does not and cannot set into motion a vocabulary that is not final, that bears 
therefore ‘an elementary and fundamental relation to all world-view formation’.18 But 
Heidegger’s nostalgia delineates the possibility of this very impossibility—it paves the way 
not for us to reflect on the nature of a particular world view, say the Western, but something 
deeper. The concept of “world-view” itself is composite of a certain world-view, and to even 
begin contemplating another world-view is not tantamount to departing from the existing 
world-view as such. Ultimately, it is the Western world-view that situates its own contradiction 
 
15 See Jean-Luc Nancy, ‘Introduction’, in Who Comes After the Subject? ed. by Eduardo Cadava (New 
York: Routledge, 1996), pp. 1-8.  
16 See Rorty, ‘Heidegger, Contingency and Pragmatism’, p. 528. 
17 Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. by Joan Stambaugh (New York: State University of New 
York Press, 1996), p. 235. 
18 Rorty, ‘Heidegger, Contingency and Pragmatism’, p. 530. 
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within its own form. To ask what another world-view may be is a question precisely generated 
by the Western world-view. 
The reverse side of Heideggerian nostalgia, as Jacques Derrida once famously commented, is 
Heideggerian hope.19 Heidegger has not failed to engender the conception of the ontic even 
and especially with the recognition of it being an ontological formation. The question he has 
thrown us into is not what another world-view may look like, but what a/any world-view is not. 
In order to comprehend this latter scenario, we must rely on our world-view (the only available 
final vocabulary) and ask what is. Or, what is final about our final vocabulary. As such, of 
course, this is an impossible pursuit. Precisely because our vocabulary is final, using it 
automatically bars us from situating its finality. A vocabulary is final in the sense that it fails 
to account for, or come to terms with, its own finality. By rendering the question concerning 
onticity itself ontological, that is by designating a final vocabulary as such, Heidegger’s 
nostalgia for the elementary and the primordial sets up simultaneously the hope of its 
impossibility. Here, I imagine this impossibility in another name, the subaltern. 
Originally a Gramscian notion of subalternity designating the oppressed subject, it takes a turn 
with Gayatri Spivak’s 1983 essay Can the Subaltern Speak?, where she makes the startling 
claim that there simply is no manner of speech available to the subaltern.20 Likewise to the rest 
of us, it would seem, there is no other mannerism available. That is, no vocabulary other than 
that of the totality of all possible languages, or the summation of all final and definite 
vocabularies; the manner of speech in effect being speech itself. Speech is simultaneously the 
only “manner of speech”, as language is the only means of speaking. Because in speech we 
may never realise what speech is about, we are simultaneously excluded from the knowledge 
of what speech is not about: the subaltern. My contention is with how the subaltern cannot be 
known, cannot be put to terms, because the subaltern is what “terms” are not about. Spivak 
likewise proclaims that the subaltern cannot speak; which is to say, the subaltern cannot be 
heard. Subalternity became a highly influential motif in postcolonial theory that scholars in the 
field continue to wrestle with. My interest in the concept is in regards to its own conceptual 
(Heideggerian) framework. 
Subalternity thus relates to Being in a very particular manner. If, as Rorty claims, Being is what 
final vocabularies are about, subaltern is what final vocabularies are not about. The crucial 
injunction coming out of the concept that I had framed in a slightly different fashion earlier is 
the fact that the underlying premise of all final vocabularies is one generated by a singular final 
vocabulary. A final vocabulary or a particular world view that appears to itself as such has 
come to terms with its own inherent contradiction. Like a universal, in claiming itself to be, 
foregoes its own universality and becomes reduced to a particular. The negation of universality 
that lies at the heart of the universal renders it a universal, one among many possible ones; that 
 
19 See Jacques Derrida, ‘Différance’, in Margins of Philosophy, trans. Alan Boss (Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press, 1982), pp. 1-28, p. 27: “From the vantage of this laughter and this dance, from the 
vantage of the affirmation foreign to all dialects, the other side of nostalgia {cette autre face de la 
nostalgie}, what I will call Heideggerian hope {espérance}, comes into question’. 
20 Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, ‘Can the Subaltern Speak?’, in Marxism and the Interpretation of 
Culture (London: Macmillan, 1988), pp. 24-28. 
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is, the paradoxical rendering of a particular universal. It is a mistaken claim, therefore, that 
ahistoricity appears as such within a particular historical epoch. Within the historical epoch 
itself, questions of historicity can never arise. They only arise in retrospect with the givenness 
of the epoch being already unveiled. The appearance of ahistoricity is a given in any historical 
epoch. For instance, the particularity of the capitalist historical formation is a Marxist problem; 
it is one that Marx envisages when he has already in theory anticipated antecedents to 
capitalism. 
This is what a final vocabulary designates: the impossibility of possibilities other than itself. 
The givenness of Western metaphysics, of a particular world-view; the thrown-ness of our 
status with regards to our world demonstrates in every case the inevitability of the latter. But 
such a foregone conclusion is not the same as a foreclosure. This concluding is in fact the 
unfolding of contingency. The inevitability of our world is constitutive also of the contingency 
of our world. That is, there is no way of commenting on the inevitability of our given-ness from 
outside our givenness. To quarrel with Butler, there is indeed an ahistorical basis to each 
particular historical contingency.21 The ahistorical here is “historicity” itself. To repeat Lacan, 
the notion of a limit that is internal and not external would precisely be of this limit as a non-
limit. Anything, absolutely anything and everything is rendered possible, because the space of 
“anything” and the totality of all such spaces—everything is defined within the limit of 
possibility itself. When we say something is possible, the possibility of this “something” has 
already taken place. 
In Anxiety, Lacan writes: 
In the very locus where your mental wont tells you to seek out the subject, right where, 
despite yourself, the subject emerges when, for example, Freud indicates the source of 
the aim, right where, in discourse, there stands that which you articulate as being you 
in a word, right where you say I—that is where, at the level of the unconscious, the a 
properly speaking is located. […] At this level, you are a, the object, and everyone 
knows that this is what is intolerable and not only to discourse itself, which betrays 
this.22 
The enunciated subject cannot but be the object of enunciation. The I that locates, designates, 
and fixes me is by design located outside of me. The finality of a final vocabulary as I explained 
earlier cannot be situated within it. While of course it is generated from within, it is always 
located on the outside. In claiming Being is that which it is not, that it contends with its own 
negation at its heart, or in its Hegelian rendition as subject (that which is the carrier of its own 
contradiction), my wager is Being is the subaltern. Furthermore, it is not only that surmising 
about Being or contemplating its nature is the rendering of subalternity. Subalternity is a 
problem of Being. Spivak’s emphasis on the ‘crisis of subalternity’ as that which reifies the 
status of subalternity is an alliteration of the crisis of language in passing over the force of its 
 
21 See Butler, Gender Trouble, pp. 49-54. 
22 Jacques Lacan, The Seminar, Book X: Anxiety (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2000),          
p. 141. 
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most elementary words.23  The revelation of subalternity as such is always in terms other than 
subaltern, that is in a dominant form; as Spivak writes: ‘when a line of communication is 
established between a member of subaltern groups and the circuits of citizenship or 
instituitionality, the subaltern has been inserted into the long road to hegemony’.24 The 
revelation of subaltern content within dominant form is curious. The status of the subaltern as 
such is seemingly disclosed at the very point of its effacement or its negation by dominant 
forces. While the definition of being subaltern defeats precisely the logic of reification or 
appearance, this definition is only established (appears in the dominant register) as a result of 
its own radical undoing. In this sense, the essence of the subaltern is in its fundamental 
unknowability; the very moment it becomes locatable or knowable it simultaneously ceases to 
be subaltern. From Ashbery’s ‘Tenth Symphnoy’: 
They’re so clever about some things 
Probably smarter generally than we are 
Although there is supposed to be something 
We have that they don’t—don’t ask me 
What it is.25 
 
If in Being’s poem marks the “silence” (the subaltern cannot speak, cannot be heard), in the 
background of which our understandings of Being take shape (that is, Being must be), Ashbery 
actively constructs and cultivates this silence. The silence, which is really just a larger openness 
of other understandings of being as yet unhad, designates the silence also of other, equally 
elementary words (as yet unspoken) that lies beyond the world that is made available by our 
elementary words. This is the quality of being primordial. In this he shares a profoundly 
Romantic sentiment coupled with a Heideggerian consciousness. While words are what we use 
to tell stories to and about ourselves (aletheia, let Being be), they cannot possibly express our 
intuitional being (not let Being be), even though being can only become aware of itself by using 
them (let Being be by not letting Being be). Wordsworth, like Keats, can tell stories, stories 
about himself, but his poetry is also beginning to investigate the power of language in poetry 
to deny explicit meaning, to be precise about nothing more than itself ‘and something ever 
more about to be’.26 If the Romantics had thus cautioned themselves into avoiding explicit 
meaningfulness, Ashbery throws this caution to the wind. Some way along his predecessors, 
he fully denounces any attempt at meaning anything at all. There is no need to mean anything, 
because meaning does not have to be. People do not read poetry for the same reason they buy 
ticket for a bus ride, because they mean to go somewhere. With poetry, we do not mean, or we 
do not know what we mean, which in any case is the same thing. Ashbery constructs thus a site 
of total obscurantism, where authentic aletheia may take place. And what truly is the nature of 
this disclosure, this revelation? It is that words are not inadequate because the quest for 
meaning produces its opposite: absolute non-meaning. The revelation is not the revelation of 
Being or what it is about; rather, it is what it is not about: fixed meaning/final vocabularies. 
 
23 Spivak, p. 27. 
24 ibid. 
25 John Ashbery, ‘Tenth Symphony’, in Self-Portrait in a Convex Mirror, p. 46. 
26 William Wordsworth, The Prelude: A Parallel Text (New York: Penguin Books, 1995), p. 160. 
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Being is instead what these are about: contingency and its awareness, pragmatism. Ashbery 
further writes: 
Yes, but—there are no ‘yes, buts’. 
The body is what all this is about and it dispenses 
In sheeted fragments, all somewhere around 
But difficult to read correctly since there is 
No common vantage point, no point of view 
Like the I in a novel. And in truth 
No one never saw the point of any.27 
 
In an uneasy time of uncertainties, the unprecedented fusion of a superficial plurality and an 
all-encompassing uniformity produces, for a poet such as John Ashbery, a universe teeming 
with diverse opportunities. Combining reminders that only attend to the daily detail to the 
obstinacy of particular circumstance, the poet creates a utopia with reminders that all things 
are possible, that there are no a priori or destined limits to our imagination or our achievement 
without getting drawn into grand narratives that only a lost sense of contingency can give rise 
to, exemplifying all of the Heideggerian nostalgia minus its hope. There is not even a need for 
the latter. Hope is but a nostalgic form(ul)ation. 
Heidegger’s preference for poetry over metaphysics is indeed a metaphysical exercise. I forgive 
him because, engaged in metaphysical rhetoric myself, I am in no position to be unforgiving. 
There is another reason. Heidegger has rendered Ashbery relatable, or he has rendered a me 
that relates to Ashbery. And while my relation to Ashbery is not poetic but metaphysical—as 
givenness of my language and my world, the situatedness of a constellation—it nevertheless 
fails to not appreciate Ashbery and make sense of him. For if the latter were to happen, the 
ultimate epistemic violence—will-to-power, its madness and relations—would crush 
Heidegger’s hope.  
With Ashbery at least, that is not possible. Heidegger is in safe of hands. In ‘A Man of Words’ 
the poet says (of himself one must presume): 
Behind the mask 
Is still a continental appreciation 
Of what is fine, rarely appears and when it does is already 







27 John Ashbery, ‘No Way of Knowing’, in Self-Portrait in a Convex Mirror, p. 56. 
28 John Ashbery, ‘A Man of Words’, in Self-Portrait in a Convex Mirror, p. 8. 
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